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Over the last 20 years, work surrounding theories of embodiment and the role of the putative
mirror neuron system (MNS) in humans has been hotly debated. In 2000, Ramachandran (2000,
p. 1) suggested that mirror neurons would do for psychology what DNA did for biology, providing
“a unifying framework” that would help explain a host of mental abilities.” In fact, the strong
evidence for action/perception coupling observed in macaque mirror neurons led several authors
to implicate this system in higher order functions in humans, such as empathy, language and theory
of mind (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004; but see Hickok, 2009). Thus, embodiment
is a broad area of study that suggests that motor resonance participates in several of these higher
order processes. However, the exact role played by specific brain structures and/or actual mirror
neurons in these processes varies greatly across theories and authors. This special issue brought
together 12 studies conducted with healthy as well as brain-injured populations, behavioral as well
as imaging techniques (functional and structural), and opinion pieces and responses. Through this
broad landscape, we offer a fresh and frugal approach to the challenges and controversies of the
translational neuroscience of embodiment and the MNS.
Two of the articles in this collection addressed how the human MNS might underlie the
physiological mechanisms that give rise to human emotions. In “Motor empathy is a consequence
ofmisattribution of sensory information in observers,”Mahayana et al. (2014) used TMS tomeasure
participants’ reactions while they observed videos of painful stimuli being inflicted on another
person. Their results suggest that empathymay be partially caused by amisattribution of perceptual
information: pain experienced in someone else is perceived as occurring in oneself. This finding
raises an interesting and novel view on embodiment that suggests that the empathy experienced
through our mirror system is in fact selfish, as it mostly reflects empathy toward ourselves. In
“Washing the guilt away: effects of personal versus vicarious cleansing on guilty feelings and
prosociality,” Xu et al. (2014) asked participants to write about a guilt-inducing past wrong and
were then asked to wash their hands, watch a video of someone washing their hands, or a video of
someone typing. They were then asked whether they would help a Ph.D. student with her thesis
by answering some questions. Participants who felt the least guilty were those who washed their
hands, followed by those who watched the hands-washing video, and then by those who watched
the typing video. Also, participants who felt most guilty were more likely to help the student with
her project. The authors conclude that washing one’s hands or watching someone else washing their
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hands can be good for feelings of guilt, but not compassion.
Both studies offer new evidence for the connection between inner
‘motor resonance’ and emotion (i.e., Wicker et al., 2003). Also,
the study by Xu et al. and that of Kacinik (see below) are classic
examples of embodied language, where even the enactment of
metaphorical expressions can strongly activate themirror neuron
system.
In “Language comprehension warps the mirror neuron
system,” Zarr et al. (2013) asked participants to read sentences
describing the transfer of objects away or toward the reader.
The adapting sentences disrupted prediction of actions in the
same direction, but (a) only for videos of biological motion,
and (b) only when the effector implied by the language
(e.g., the hand) matched the videos. Similarly, Kacinik (2014)
asked participants to read a story and act out the idioms
presented (e.g., literally sitting on the fence, on the edge of
one’s seat) in “Sticking your neck out and burying the hatchet:
what idioms reveal about embodied simulation.” They found
that the process of embodying idioms simply by engaging in
the corresponding actions activated their meaning enough to
significantly influence subsequent processing and judgments.
Finally, in “Action relevance in linguistic context drives word-
induced motor activity,” Aravena et al. (2014) analyzed online
modulations of grip force while subjects listened to target words
embedded in different linguistic contexts. They conclude that
motor structure activation is part of a dynamic process that
integrates the lexical meaning potential of a term and the
context in the online construction of a situation model, which
is a crucial process for fluent and efficient online language
comprehension. Similarly to Xu et al. (see above), these three
articles support the notion that the motor resonance of language
strongly influences its comprehension. The strict version of this
view, which argues that semiotic coding would mostly rely on
the human MNS (see Pulvermüller et al., 2014), continues to
be controversial and is challenged by other articles in this topic
(see below).
Two articles used neuroimaging to identify the neural
correlates of embodiment. In an fMRI study entitled “Hand
specific representations in language comprehension,” Moody-
Triantis et al. (2014) asked participants to perform right or left
hand actions and then read sentences describing these same
actions. They found that language-induced activity overlapped
with pre-motor and parietal regions associated with action
planning rather than those observed in action execution,
endorsing a less strict interpretation of the MNS in humans,
in which association (and not primary motor cortices) are
activated. In “Neuroanatomical substrates of action perception
and understanding: an anatomic likelihood estimation meta-
analysis of lesion-symptom mapping studies in brain injured
patients” (2014), Urgesi et al. (2014) conducted a meta-analysis
of 11 studies and 361 patients and reported that non-linguistic
action perception and understanding are associated with the
inferior frontal cortex, the inferior parietal cortex and the
middle/superior temporal cortex. Again, rather than primary
motor cortex, they found that surrounding regions in frontal,
parietal, and temporal cortex were associated with action
perception.
Two other theoretical/opinion articles also steer away from
stricter MNS interpretations and suggest that the motor
system influences action perception but is not its sole
critical component. In “Homuncular mirrors: misunderstanding
causality in embodied cognition,” Mikulan et al. (2015)
propose a network view of language processing in which the
mirror neuron system plays an important role in priming or
facilitating understanding (or even indexing action semantics)
but not directly in action understanding. Similarly, Bach et al.
(2014) propose an object-based view of action understanding
in “The affordance-matching hypothesis: how objects guide
action understanding and prediction.” They suggest that object
knowledge (what an object is for and how it is used) informs and
constrains action interpretation and prediction.
Additionally, we included two response pieces to Bach et al.’s
proposal, one by Osiurak (2014) and the other by Uithol and
Maranesi (2014). The latter, in turn, received a response from
Bach and colleagues (under review), which is also included
in this issue. Osiurak proposes the “mechanical knowledge
hypothesis,” which diminishes the role of manipulation in
action understanding and distances itself from traditional MN
theories, while Uithol and Maranesi support an enactivist view,
which criticizes the need for integrating the processes of action
interpretation and action prediction. On the other hand, Bach
et al.’s counter argument suggests that the match is indeed
needed to fulfill the requirements of a predictive model of action
understanding.
Intriguingly, in “Observation and imitation of actions
performed by humans, androids and robots: an EMG study,”
Hofree et al. (2015) show that these phenomena are not limited
to agents with a biological appearance but also for robotic
agents, opening important implications regarding human-robot
interaction.
All of these works expand our understanding of the human
MNS by extending previous work and delimiting the boundaries
of how we should interpret those findings. As a group,
contributing authors seem to agree on less strict interpretations
of embodiment and the human MNS, suggesting these are
strong contributors to various aspects of action and cognition,
but do not represent the sole basis of language, learning, or
comprehension. Future work should further explore the precise
mechanisms underlying the links between action planning,
execution, and semantic processing, as well as the relative
dependence of distinct cognitive processes on mirror activity.
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